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Abstract—A standard requirement for a signature scheme
is that it is existentially unforgeable under chosen message
attacks (EUF-CMA), alongside other properties of interest such
as strong unforgeability (SUF-CMA), and resilience against key
substitution attacks.
Remarkably, no detailed proofs have ever been given for these
security properties for EdDSA, and in particular its Ed25519
instantiations. Ed25519 is one of the most efficient and widely
used signature schemes, and different instantiations of Ed25519
are used in protocols such as TLS 1.3, SSH, Tor, ZCash, and
WhatsApp/Signal. The differences between these instantiations
are subtle, and only supported by informal arguments, with many
works assuming results can be directly transferred from Schnorr
signatures. Similarly, several proofs of protocol security simply
assume that Ed25519 satisfies properties such as EUF-CMA or
SUF-CMA.
In this work we provide the first detailed analysis and security
proofs of Ed25519 signature schemes. While the design of
the schemes follows the well-established Fiat-Shamir paradigm,
which should guarantee existential unforgeability, there are many
side cases and encoding details that complicate the proofs, and
all other security properties needed to be proven independently.
Our work provides scientific rationale for choosing among
several Ed25519 variants and understanding their properties, fills
a much needed proof gap in modern protocol proofs that use these
signatures, and supports further standardisation efforts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ed25519 signature scheme was introduced in 2011
by Bernstein, Duif, Lange, Schwabe, and Yang in the paper
“High-speed high-security signatures” [1]. The efficiency of the
scheme has led to a global uptake in modern applications, and
it is now used in TLS 1.3, SSH, Tor, ZCash, and messaging
protocols based on the Signal protocol such as WhatsApp.
For modern digital signature schemes the quintessential
property is existential unforgeability under chosen message
attacks (EUF-CMA) [2]. This property basically requires that
an adversary cannot construct a signature for a message that
the key owner did not sign previously.
A stronger property that can be met by signature schemes, is
that of strong unforgeability under chosen message attacks
(SUF-CMA). This property additionally requires that the
adversary cannot construct an alternative signature for a given
signed message. A high-profile example exploiting the absence
of this property is the Mt. Gox attack on Bitcoin [3]. In this
attack, signatures on transactions were mauled by an adversarial
recipient before being stored on the blockchain. The recipient
would then claim that the transaction failed. The sender would
check the blockchain, and would indeed not find their exact
signature (due to mauling), conclude that it apparently failed,
and start a new transfer. Yet both signatures would be valid and
the recipient would thus receive the double amount. This attack
would not have been possible with a strongly unforgeable (SUF-
CMA) signature scheme as this notion prohibits malleability.
Additionally, in many practical systems, it is highly desirable
that signature schemes resist key substitution attacks [4], [5].
In such attacks the adversary computes specific public keys,
e.g., based on observed signatures of honest signers, such
that these honest signatures can also be verified under the
adversary’s new public keys. This has been shown to lead to
attacks on protocols such as Let’s Encrypt Certificate Issuance
and SOAP’s WS-Security [4].
Surprisingly, full proofs of any of these security properties
have never been given for Ed25519. The original publica-
tions [1], [6] focused on efficiency of computation, and do
not contain a precise statement on the security property that is
offered by the scheme, which in the following we will refer
to as Ed25519-Original. Because the scheme is said to be
constructed via the Fiat-Shamir transform, it should follow that
Ed25519-Original at least provides EUF-CMA security, but full
details were never provided. The papers do refer to malleability
and argue that is not relevant for the standard definitions of
signature scheme security, but their definition of malleability
does not agree with the common usage of the term. It also
transpires that, whilst the source code presented alongside the
paper accepts mangled signatures (hence is not SUF-CMA),
the additional check included in the paper’s description but
not the source code, is actually sufficient to prove SUF-CMA,
as we will show. This further adds to the confusion around the
security properties enjoyed by Ed25519.
While the original papers came with a full implementation
of Ed25519-Original, later implementations made various
modifications. Notably, the Ed25519-IETF version that was
standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
in [7] includes a check that is claimed to prevent malleability,
thereby implicitly suggesting that Ed25519-IETF is strongly
unforgeable (SUF-CMA). Later versions, such as the ones used
by LibSodium [8] and ZCash [9] included additional group
element checks. We return to the details of these differences
in Section IV-A. This leads to the obvious question: which
exact properties are actually provided by the various Ed25519
schemes? This question is especially timely as Ed25519 is
currently proposed for inclusion in the USA’s National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard for Digital
Signature Schemes [10]–[12] and was recently included in
the TLS 1.3 standard [13].
Over the last years, several published works reported security
proofs of systems that use Ed25519, but require specific
cryptographic security notions from their signature schemes,
such as computational proofs of TLS 1.3’s properties [14]–[17].
These proofs assume that Ed25519-IETF satisfies EUF-CMA,
leaving a proof gap. A claimed computational proof of
SSH [18] requires that all supported signature schemes provide
SUF-CMA. However, SSH implementations also allow the
use of the malleable Ed25519-Original, which leads to a
counterexample to the security statement. The Signal protocol
library implements yet another variant of the Ed25519 signature
scheme. Adding to the confusion, a recent work [19] claims
that the results on Schnorr signatures in prime order groups
implies Ed25519-Original enjoys SUF-CMA and resistance to
key substitution attacks. We will see in Section V-C that this
is not the case.
In this work we remedy these proof gaps, and establish
further properties of Ed25519 signature schemes. As we will
see, the devil is in the detail: the specific details of Ed25519
(e.g., small subgroup elements, scalar clamping) require subtle
tailoring of the proof details, and lead to mismatches such as
the lack of SUF-CMA security for Ed25519-Original despite its
similarities to Fiat-Shamir applied to the Schnorr identification
scheme, which ‘should’ imply that SUF-CMA security holds.
These subtleties also manifest themselves in the requirements
of various checks. Thus, our work not only fills these highly-
needed proof gaps, but also provides additional insight into
the subtle differences between Ed25519 schemes which are
summarized in Table I.
Our main contributions are the following.
• We provide the first detailed proof that
Ed25519-Original [1] is indeed EUF-CMA secure.
• We provide the first proof that Ed25519-IETF [7] is
actually SUF-CMA secure.
• We prove that all Ed25519 schemes are resilient against
key substitution attacks, and that if small subgroup
keys are rejected as in LibSodium, a signature uniquely
identifies a message, even for malicious keys.
• In a wider sense, our results retroactively support the stan-
dardisation of Ed25519-IETF, and support the ongoing
standardisation by NIST.
Overview: In Section II we present related work, and Section III
recalls background knowledge. Section IV presents Ed25519
signature schemes and their subtle differences from Schnorr
identification schemes. We provide the security proofs in
Section V and we conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A. History of EdDSA and Ed25519
Ed25519-Original is just one instantiation of the more
general EdDSA signature scheme, which was introduced in
the same paper [1], [6]. EdDSA is itself a variant of the
well-known Schnorr signature scheme [20], [21]. Ed25519 is
EdDSA instantiated over curve Edwards25519 [1] and remains
by far the most popular instantiation of EdDSA, despite its
later extension to support alternative curves [7], [22].
EdDSA instantiations such as Ed25519-Original can sign
and verify signatures substantially faster than almost all other
signatures schemes at similar security levels. For schemes that
have comparable speeds, Ed25519-Original further provides
considerably smaller signatures, producing 64-byte signatures
and 32-byte public keys. Additionally, EdDSA is widely
considered to provide better resistance to side-channel attacks
than alternative schemes. However, the original papers [1],
[6] contain no formal statements (and consequently, no actual
proofs) of its security properties.
By virtue of its outstanding performance with respect to
efficiency and bandwidth, EdDSA was standardised by the IETF
between 2015 and 2017 [7]. In 2019, EdDSA was proposed to
also be adopted as part of NIST’s Digital Signature Standard
(DSS) [10], [11]. In early 2020, the public call for comments
was closed [12], but as of writing, no new version has appeared.
B. Related proofs
The Fiat-Shamir paradigm was proposed by Fiat and
Shamir [23] as a generic approach to derive a secure signature
scheme from a canonical identification schemes (CID). A
vast body of work followed this seminal result and the
aforementioned Schnorr signatures [20], [21], on which EdDSA
was built, is probably one of the most famous examples
of the transform’s power to build efficient and provably-
secure signatures. Here we merely present some of the many
milestones related to Fiat-Shamir that are most relevant for
our work. While the original presentation [23] lacked security
proofs, Pointcheval and Stern [24], [25] closed this gap by
providing proofs in the (then) relatively new random oracle
model [26]. Abdalla et al. [27] indicated the minimal conditions
for the underlying identification scheme to prove Fiat-Shamir
transformed signatures to be EUF-CMA secure. In 2016, Kiltz
et al. [28], [29] provided a concrete and modular security
analysis of Fiat-Shamir signatures in both the single-user and
multi-user setting, closing the tightness gap of the reduction.
The treatment of the multi-user setting is especially interest-
ing as in practical applications there exist many different public
keys for an adversary to attack. In 2002, Galbraith, Malone-
Lee, and Smart [30] considered security of signatures in this
multi-user setting. They showed that if an adversary were to
attack N keys at once, its advantage can increase only at most
by a factor of N (this is often referred to as the generic bound).
Their second result claimed that for Schnorr-like signatures
one can do even better and achieve a tight reduction between
single-user and multi-user security. Much later, Bernstein [31]
exposed a flaw in this tight proof that to this date could not
be resolved. However, Bernstein [31] was able to show that
one can achieve a tight reduction between single-user security
of Schnorr signatures and multi-user security of key-prefixed
Schnorr signatures. Key prefixing had been introduced earlier
by Menezes and Smart [32] in the context of key-substitution
attacks, where they also (controversially) claimed that it is
not necessary to actively mitigate key-substitution attacks
for Schnorr signatures. In contrast, the designs of Ed25519
signatures [1], [7] nevertheless employ key-prefixing. Kiltz et
al. [28] show that if the underlying canonical identification
scheme achieves random self-reducibility in the random oracle
model, then a tight reduction between multi-user and single-user
security can be achieved without key prefixing. In Appendix C,
we briefly discuss multi-user security in light of these results.
C. Computational proofs of systems that use Ed25519
Because of its performance and conjectured security, Ed-
DSA’s Ed25519 instantiation over Edwards25519 has become
one of the most popular digital signature schemes, appearing
in innumerable applications and protocols including TLS 1.3
[13], SSH [33], Tor, ZCash, and the Signal protocol [34].
Regarding such systems, there exists numerous security
proofs which hold only when the deployed digital signatures
satisfy certain conditions. For example, Bhargavan et al. [14]
developed the first machine-checked cryptographic proof for
TLS 1.3 draft-18 using the verification tool CryptoVerif, thereby
assuming that Ed25519-IETF meets EUF-CMA. Similarly, [15]
proved the security of session resumption in the TLS 1.3
draft-05 full handshakes and [16] proved the security of (a
slightly modified version of) the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
handshake of TLS 1.3 with unilateral authentication. Kobeissi,
Bhargavan, and Blanchet [35] analyzed a model of the Signal
protocol in CryptoVerif assuming EUF-CMA security of
Signal’s X-Ed25519 scheme. However, none of these schemes
have actually been proven to achieve EUF-CMA security.
In 2014, SSH was proven to be secure even when the same
signing key is used across multiple ciphersuites, assuming that
the underlying signature is strongly unforgeable [18]1. However,
SSH implementations may use the originally-proposed version
Ed25519-Original (e.g., [37]), which does not satisfy SUF-
CMA. This yields a counterexample in their security model:
mauling a signature in an otherwise honest session allows a
session-key reveal on the peer, as the sessions no longer match.
Thus, their proof does not apply as-is to SSH implementations
that use Ed25519-Original. [19] claims that the results on
Schnorr signatures in prime order groups imply that Ed25519
enjoys SUF-CMA and resistance to key substitution attacks,
which, as we will see in Section V-C is not the case.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce the necessary notation and
definitions. In particular, we also review the Fiat-Shamir
transform [23] which allows to transform passively-secure
(interactive) identification protocols into (non-interactive) sig-
nature schemes which are secure against active adversaries.
1The full version of the paper [36] explicitly uses the definition for strong
unforgeability, even though both versions use a “euf-cma” shorthand.
Notation: For an integer q, we denote by Fq the finite field
with order q. For a bit string h and an integer i, we let h[i]
denote the i-th bit of h. Overloading notation, we write a
for the bitstring encoding of a, where a can be an integer or
a curve point. We describe the details of these encodings at
the start of Section IV. The algorithms in this paper run in
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT), unless stated otherwise,
and we write y $←− A(x) for the probabilistic execution of
algorithm A on input x with output y. If A is a deterministic
algorithm we write y ← A(x). Furthermore, AO(x) denotes
that A has access to the oracle O during its execution on input
x. By pp we denote the public parameters of the scheme and
system. We assume that they are always known to the adversary
A and thus omit pp from its explicit input. For variables x, y,
we denote by y ← x, the assignment of value x to y and
by s $←− D we denote the sampling of an element x from
the probability distribution D; for simplicity, we denote the
uniform sampling of an element x from a set X by x $←− X .
Security games Gsec-propΠ,A (pp) describe the run of an adversary
A against the security property sec-prop of a cryptographic
scheme Π parametrized by pp. We write Gsec-propΠ,A (pp) = 1
to mark the event in which A has won the game. We use 1
to represent the Boolean value True, and 0 for False. Lastly,
JstatementK, we denote the Boolean evaluation of statement.
A. Cryptographic Building Blocks
Our presentation of definitions follows the style of the
textbook by Katz and Lindell [38] with security defined in the
concrete setting which explicitly specifies the amount of time
and resources needed (cf. [38, Sec. 3.1]). We first introduce the
notion of secure signatures schemes before defining canonical
identification protocols and their security.
Definition 1 (Signature scheme). A signature scheme S =
(KGen,Sign,Vfy) is a triple of algorithms, where KGen is
called the key generation algorithm, Sign is called the signing
algorithm, and Vfy is called the verification algorithm.
Key generation KGen takes as input the public parameters
pp and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk, i.e.,
(pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp).
Signing Sign takes as input a secret key sk as well as the
message m ∈ M to be signed and outputs a signature
σ, i.e., σ $←− Sign(sk,m). Here, M is called the message
space.
Verification Vfy takes as input a public key pk, a signature
σ and message m ∈ M. It deterministically outputs 1,
i.e., 1← Vfy(pk, σ,m) if σ is a valid signature over m
wrt. pk, else it outputs 0.
We call a signature scheme S = (KGen,Sign,Vfy) correct
if for all (pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp) and all messages m ∈ M:
1← Vfy(pk, Sign(sk,m),m).
The standard notion for security of signature schemes is that
of (single-user) existential unforgeability under chosen message
attacks. Intuitively, this guarantees that for a fixed public key,
an adversary A cannot generate a valid signature on a new
message, for which it has not seen a valid signature before. A
stronger definition of security is that of (single-user) strong
unforgeability, which will also play a role later in the paper.
Here, the adversary is not restricted to forging signatures on
new messages for a fixed public key but may also generate a
signature on a message on which it has seen (other) signatures.
Both of these notions can then be transferred to the multi-user
setting, where there is not just a single public key generated
by the challenger but multiple honestly generated keys. The
adversary’s goal is then to (existentially or strongly) forge a
signature under any of these keys.
Definition 2 (EUF-CMA and SUF-CMA security). Let S =
(KGen,Sign,Vfy) be a signature scheme. Consider the security
games Geuf-cmaS,A and G
suf-cma
S,A as defined in Fig. 1. We say
that a signature scheme S is (t, ε,QS)-EUF-CMA-secure or
existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks, if
for any adversary A running in time at most t, making
at most QS queries to the signing oracle, the probability
Pr
[
Geuf-cmaS,A (pp) = 1
]
≤ ε.
Analogously, we say that S is (t, ε,QS)-SUF-CMA-secure
or strongly unforgeable under chosen message attacks.
As mentioned before, secure signature schemes can be built
from identification protocols. Identification protocols allow a
so-called prover that holds a secret key sk to authenticate
to a verifier who holds the corresponding public key pk.
Here we only consider so-called canonical identification
protocols, which consist of three moves: The prover P sends a
commitment com to the verifier V. The verifier V then samples
a random challenge ch and sends it to P. Finally, P sends
a response rsp to V, whose decision is then a deterministic
function of their conversation (com, ch, rsp) and P’s public
key. More formally:
Definition 3 (Canonical identification protocol). A canonical
identification protocol CID = (KGen,P = (P1,P2),V =
(V1,V2)) is a triple of algorithms:
Key generation KGen takes as input the public parameters
pp and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk, i.e.,
(pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp).
The prover P = (P1,P2) is a two-stage algorithm that takes
as input a secret key sk. P1 takes as input sk and outputs
a commitment com as well as some state st. P2 takes as
input the challenge ch (sent by the verifier V1) as well
as state st and outputs a response rsp.
The verifier V = (V1,V2) is a two-stage algorithm that is
initialized with a public key pk. V1 selects a random
challenge ch and sends it to the prover. V2 takes as input
the public key, the com, ch and rsp and outputs 1 if it
accepts the conversation (com, ch, rsp) for pk or 0 if it
rejects.
For all (pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp), we require that if P(sk) and
V(pk) interact honestly within an instance of the protocol,
then the verifier accepts. I.e., for (com, st) $←− P1(sk),
ch $←− V1, and rsp $←− P2(com, ch, st), we have verifier
Pr[1← V2(pk, com, ch, rsp)] = 1.
We sometimes denote the interactive run of the identification
protocol between the prover and the verifier by P  V or
P(sk)  V(pk). We write Trans [P(sk) V(pk)] to denote
a conversation (com, ch, rsp) resulting from the interaction be-
tween P and V and identify V2(pk, com, ch, rsp) with the final
decision ∈ {0, 1} of the verifier. If 1← V2(pk, com, ch, rsp),
we say that (com, ch, rsp) is an accepting conversation for pk,
or simply a valid conversation.
Intuitively, the basic security of identification protocols
is defined in terms of the inability of an adversary A to
impersonate the prover towards an honest verifier without
knowledge of the prover’s secret key. This can be in the setting
where A only has access to the public key of the prover (called
IMP-KOA for security against impersonation under key-only
attacks), or in the stronger setting, where A can observe honest
conversations between the prover and the verifier (IMP-PA for
security against impersonation under passive attacks):
Definition 4 (IMP-KOA and IMP-PA security). Let CID =
(KGen,P,V) be a canonical identification protocol and let
A be an algorithm. Consider the security game GIMP-KOACID,A as
defined on the left in Fig. 2. We say that CID is (t, ε)-secure
against impersonation under key-only attacks, or simply (t, ε)-
IMP-KOA-secure, if for any algorithm A running in time at
most t the probability Pr
[
GIMP-KOACID,A (pp) = 1
]
≤ ε.
Similarly, consider the game GIMP-PAA as defined on the
right in Fig. 2. We say that CID is (t, ε,QT )-secure against
impersonation under passive attacks, or simply (t, ε,QT )-
IMP-PA-secure, if for any algorithm A running in time at






To argue about the security of canonical identification
protocols, it is useful to talk about the min-entropy of an
identification scheme as well as the notion of honest-verifier
zero-knowledge,or HVZK, for short. The former notion captures
the unpredictability of commitments in the protocol, whereas
HVZK formalizes the property that an adversary A gains no
additional knowledge from honest interactions P V, since
A could generate such conversations on its own.
Definition 5 (Min-entropy of identification scheme). We say
that a canonical identification protocol CID = (KGen,P,V)
has α bits min-entropy if the probability over the choice
(pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp), that the commitment generated by
P1(sk) is from a distribution with at least α bits of min-entropy,
is at least 1 − 2α. Recall that a discrete random variable
X has α bits of min-entropy, denoted by H∞(X) := α, if
max
x
(Pr[X = x]) = 2−α.
Definition 6 (Honest-verifier zero-knowledge). Let CID =
(KGen,P,V) be a canonical identification protocol. We say
that CID is εzk-honest-verifier zero-knowledge, or εzk-HVZK
for short, if there exists a PPT algorithm Sim, called the
simulator, such that for all (pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp), the outputs
of Sim(pk) can only be distinguished from real conversations
P(sk) V(pk) with probability at most εzk.
Geuf-cmaS,A (pp):
1 LSign ← ∅
2 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp)
3 (m?, σ?) $←− AOSign (pk)
4 return JVfy(pk, σ?,m?) ∧m? 6∈ LSignK
OSign(m):
5 σ $←− Sign(sk,m)
6 LSign ← LSign ∪ {m}
7 return σ
Gsuf-cmaS,A (pp):
1 LSign ← ∅
2 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp)
3 (m?, σ?) $←− AOSign (pk)
4 return JVfy(pk, σ?,m?) ∧ (m?, σ?) 6∈ LSign K
OSign(m):
5 σ $←− Sign(sk,m)
6 LSign ← LSign ∪ {(m,σ)}
7 return σ
Fig. 1. EUF-CMA security (left) and SUF-CMA security (right) of a signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign,Vfy) with differences highlighted in gray.
GIMP-KOACID,A (pp):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp)
2 ch $←− V1
3 (com, st) $←− A(pk)
4 rsp $←− A(ch, st)
5 return JV2(pk, com, ch, rsp)K
GIMP-PACID,A(pp):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp)
2 ch $←− V1
3 (com, st) $←− A(pk)
4 rsp $←− A OTrans (ch, st)
5 return JV2(pk, com, ch, rsp)K
OTrans:
6 return Trans [P(sk) V(pk)]
Fig. 2. IMP-KOA and IMP-PA security of CID = (KGen,P,V) against impersonating adversaries A with differences highlighted in gray.
The schemes discussed in this paper will have two important
properties. They are commitment recoverable, which means that
commitments can be efficiently and publicly computed from
the public key, the challenge, and the response. Furthermore,
they have (computationally) unique responses, meaning that
for a fixed instance of the protocol and commitments and
challenges, there exists at most one response such that the
verifier will accept the conversation (or a second response is
computationally infeasible to find). More formally:
Definition 7 ((Computationally) unique responses CUR). Let
CID = (KGen,P,V) be a canonical identification protocol.
We say that CID has εcur-computationally unique responses
or CUR, if for any (pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp), com $←− P1(sk) and
ch $←− V1 the probability of an adversary being able to output
two responses rsp and rsp′ such that V2(pk, com, ch, rsp) = 1
and V2(pk, com, ch, rsp′) = 1 is at most εcur. If εcur = 0 we
say that CID has unique responses.
B. The Fiat-Shamir Transform
Finally, we show the transform from secure identification
protocols to secure signature schemes. In this work, we follow
the approach by Abdalla et al. [27] when applying the Fiat-
Shamir transform, i.e., we start from a canonical identification
protocol that is secure against impersonation under passive
attack and model the hash function as a random oracle (cf.
Section III-C) to show the existential unforgeability of the
resulting signature scheme.
Let CID = (CID.KGen,P,V) be an IMP-PA-secure canon-
ical identification protocol and let H : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}λ be a
cryptographic hash function with output length λ modeled as a
random oracle. Then the signature scheme FS [CID,H] =
(FS.KGen,Sign,Vfy) constructed as described in Fig. 3 is
existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks.
FS.KGen(pp):
1 (pk, sk) $←− CID.KGen(pp)
2 return (pk, sk)
Vfy(pk,m, σ):
8 (com, ch, rsp)← σ
9 return Jch = H(com,m) ∧
V2(pk, com, ch, rsp)K
Sign(sk,m):
3 (com, st) $←− P1(sk)
4 ch← H(com,m)
5 rsp $←− P2(ch, st)
6 σ ← (com, ch, rsp)
7 return σ
Fig. 3. Signature scheme FS [CID,H] = (FS.KGen,Sign,Vfy) resulting
from the (transcript variant of) Fiat-Shamir applied to the canonical identifica-
tion protocol CID = (CID.KGen,P,V).
Note that there are different variants of the Fiat-Shamir
transform in terms of how the signatures are constructed. The
transform shown in Fig. 3 is of the transcript variant as used,
e.g., by Pointcheval and Stern [25], where the signature consists
of the entire conversation of the identification scheme.
Schnorr signatures as described in Appendix A are of
the challenge variant where the signature consists only of
the challenge and the response, i.e., σ ← (ch, rsp). This
requires that there exists an algorithm that can reconstruct
the commitment com from the public key, the challenge, and
the response. Further signatures that are of the challenge variant
are the original work by Fiat and Shamir, GQ signatures [39]
and Okamoto signatures [40]. An in-depth treatment of these
variants, including a third variant, the commitment variant,
can be found in Backendal et al. [41]. As we will later see,
Ed25519 signatures are a deterministic variant of Schnorr
signatures but in the commitment-variant of the Fiat-Shamir
transform. In order to make Fiat-Shamir signatures as described
in Fig. 3 deterministic, P1 is derandomized by using H(sk,m)
as randomness during commitment generation.
C. The Random Oracle Methodology
When applying the Fiat-Shamir transform, we do this in the
so-called random oracle model. This model was first introduced
by Bellare and Rogaway [26] and enabled security proofs for
many efficient schemes that previously had eluded the provable
security paradigm. It does so by representing a hash function
in a cryptographic scheme as an idealized random function (the
random oracle). With this idealization in place, an adversary
can only evaluate the hash function H on input x, if it queries
this random oracle on x. It is no longer able to simply evaluate
the hash function locally. In particular, this allows us to “peek”
at the adversary’s inputs to the hash function, a property of the
model that is often referred to as extractability. When queried
on input x, the random oracle then returns uniformly random
answers from the range of H for each input. For each new query
a fresh uniformly random output is sampled, but just like for
real hash functions, repeated queries are answered consistently,
i.e., the same inputs yield the same outputs. In the Fiat-Shamir
transform another (optional) property of the random oracle
is used, namely its programmability: if the adversary queries
some input x for the first time, we can set the value H(x) to a
specific, freely-chosen output value y as long as it is correctly
distributed and does not collide with previously set outputs.
Note that when our proofs are in the random oracle model
for hash function H, the security notions introduced previously
get the extra query parameter QH of the maximal number
of queries the adversary makes to the random oracle. For
example, for a signature scheme in the random oracle model
we will speak of (t, ε,Qs, QH)-EUF-CMA security instead of
(t, ε,Qs)-EUF-CMA security.
D. Elliptic Curves
Lastly we briefly recap the main theory of elliptic curves
relevant for this paper. For a more in-depth treatment of specific
concepts and constructions, we refer the interested reader to,
e.g., [43], [44]. We begin by defining elliptic curves over a
finite field Fq, which are the most common types of elliptic
curves in cryptography:
Definition 8 (Elliptic curve). Let q ≥ 5 be a prime. An elliptic
curve E defined over the finite field Fq is an equation of the
form y2 = x3+ax+b. with a, b ∈ Fq such that 4a3+27b2 6= 0.
In elliptic-curve cryptography, the group in question is the
set of points on the elliptic curve E.
Definition 9 (Points on E). Let E(Fq) be the set of pairs
(x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq satisfying the elliptic curve equation. Let O
denote a special point, the so-called point at infinity. Then the
set E(Fq) := {(x, y)|x, y ∈ Fq ∧ y2 = x3 + ax + b} ∪ {O}
denotes the points on the elliptic curve E.
With an adequately defined addition operation “+” E(Fq)
forms a group with neutral element (0, 1). The multiplication
of a curve point P with an integer n is defined as adding P n
times to itself, i.e., nP := P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
where 0P := O.
For brevity, we often write E instead of E(Fq) if the underlying
field is clear from context.
Further Definitions: The number of points on an elliptic
curve E over Fq is called the order of the curve and is denoted
by |E(Fq)|. We call an element B that generates a cyclic
subgroup the base point and write P ∈ 〈B〉 to indicate that P
is an element of the subgroup generated by B. For an element
B, we overload notation and write |B| to denote its order, i.e.,
the smallest integer n such that nB = O. If B generates a
subgroup of E(Fq), we define the cofactor to be the integer
|E(Fq)|
|B| .
1) Different Forms of Curves: There exist several different
forms of elliptic curve equations, such as Weierstraß, Mont-
gomery or Edwards form. Most relevant for this paper are
twisted Edwards curves [45] which are defined over a finite
field Fq with q > 3 prime with additional parameter a (the
twist) via the curve equation ETEd : ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2,
where a, d ∈ Fq with a, d 6= 0 and a 6= d.
Addition “+” on ETEd(Fq) is defined as follows. Let P =









Note that if a is a square in Fq and d is non-square in Fq,
then the addition operation is complete and (ETEd(Fq),+) is
a group with neutral element (0, 1). The inverse −P of a point
P = (x, y) ∈ ETEd(Fq) is (−x, y).
The twisted Edwards curve E underlying the Ed25519
constructions, which we discuss in more detail in the next
section, is birationally equivalent to curve25519 introduced
by Bernstein [46], which is of the Montgomery form and due to
its efficient arithmetic implementation yields very performant
constructions. curve25519 is defined over the finite field Fq
with q = 2255−19 prime via the curve equation curve25519:
y2 = x3 + 486662x2 + x.
2) The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem: The
security of Ed25519 signatures will ultimately be reduced
to a common complexity-theoretic hardness assumption in
cryptography: the discrete logarithm problem.
Definition 10 (ECDLP). Let E be an elliptic curve defined
over a finite field Fq and let B ∈ E(Fq) be a point of order n.
Let P ∈ 〈B〉. Then the elliptic curve discrete-log problem is
to find an integer 0 ≤ k < n such that P = kB. We say that
E is (t, ε)-hard on E if for any algorithm A running in time
at most t the probability of solving ECDLP is at most ε.










[42] Ed25519-Original S ∈ {0, ..., 2b − 1} X × X × ×
[7] Ed25519-IETF S ∈ {0, ..., L− 1} X X X × ×
[8] Ed25519-LibS S ∈ {0, ..., L− 1} ∧ |R| = L ∧ |A| = L X X X X X
TABLE I
ED25519 SCHEMES. TO FORM EACH VARIANT, REPLACE THE HIGHLIGHTED SECTION IN FIG. 4 WITH THE TEXT PRESENTED HERE. NOTE THAT 2b − 1 > L
(SEE TABLE II) SO THE LATTER CHECKS ARE STRICTER. EUF-CMA: EXISTENTIAL UNFORGEABILITY; SUF-CMA: STRONG UNFORGEABILITY; S-UEO
AND M-S-UEO DENOTE RESILIENCE AGAINST KEY SUBSTITUTION ATTACKS; MBS: MESSAGE BOUND SECURITY, ENSURING A SIGNATURE VERIFIES A
UNIQUE MESSAGE, EVEN FOR MALICIOUS KEYS.
KGen(pp):
1 k $←− {0, 1}b
2 h← H(k)





5 return (A, k)
Sign(k,m):
6 h← H(k)




8 r ← H(h[b], . . . , h[2b− 1],m)
9 R← rB
10 S ← (r + H(R,A,m)s) mod L
11 return σ = (R,S)
Vfy(A, σ = (R,S),m):
12 Check R,A ∈ E
13 Variant Specific Checks
14 return Checks succeed ∧ J2cSB = 2cR+ 2cH(R,A,m)AK
Fig. 4. Generic description of the Ed25519 signature scheme algorithms
KGen, Sign, and Vfy. Note that the highlighted line (13) varies depending
on the version of Ed25519 and the appropriate check is listed in Table I.
IV. ED25519 SIGNATURES
In this section we describe how the Ed25519 [1], [7]
signature scheme operates in detail, unravel its relationship
with Schnorr signatures and why proofs for Schnorr are not
directly applicable to Ed25519. We also describe several of the
proposed variants of Ed25519, which target stronger security
properties than provided by the original formulation.
We define the generic signature scheme Ed25519 in Fig. 4.
Part of the generic scheme description, highlighted on line 13
in Fig. 4, is replaced in the variant schemes. We summarise
these variations in Table I and discuss them further below. The
various parameters common to all variants are listed in Table II.
These parameters include those necessary to define the elliptic
curve E over which the signature scheme operates and the
hash function used.
Encodings: Integers mod L are encoded as as b-bit strings
in little endian format. Elliptic curve points (x, y) are encoded
as a (b− 1)-bit little-endian encoding of y, followed by a sign
bit which is 1 if and only if x is negative. We note an oft-
omitted property of the encoding scheme: the field element that
represents y is encoded as a (b−1) = 255-bit string, but the size
of the field is q = 2255−19, yielding a larger space of encodings
than actual elements. Similarly, the S part of the signature is
expected to be a b-bit integer, but is necessarily reduced mod L
prior to use in the signature verification. These details turn out
to have substantial consequences when showing security of
the scheme and we will highlight this in the respective proofs.
In places, the original presentation [1] and its accompanying
source code disagree on the necessary tests, e.g., the range
of L. As the source code is the basis of the most popular
Ed25519 implementations, we treat it as authoritative.
A. Variants of Ed25519
Recall that we refer to the original, and currently most widely
deployed formulation of Ed25519 as Ed25519-Original. Sev-
eral alternative specifications have also been published which
largely maintain wire compatibility with Ed25519-Original,
but substantially alter the security properties of the scheme.
In particular, variants have been published by the IETF [7],
NIST [47], and the ZCash Foundation [9]. Furthermore,
LibSodium [8], one of the most popular cryptographic libraries,
uses a set of additional checks that render it a de-facto standard.
Another variant is the use of Ristretto encodings [48] for
Ed25519. Whilst this appears promising, the draft RFC [49] is
still under active development and we do not analyze it here.
We note that the Signal Foundation [34] have also proposed
a variant with enhanced resistance to side-channel attacks
and fault resistance during signature generation. However, this
variant operates similarly to Ed25519-Original with regards
to signature verification and consequently we do not treat it
separately.
1) Pre-Hashing Variants: The IETF-standardised RFC
8032 [7] and the NIST draft standard [47] support a pre-hashing
mode for their variants. This mode allows implementations to
sign large messages whilst only needing to perform a single
pass over the message. The signed message value m is replaced
with the pre-hash PH(m), where PH is a hash function. The
IETF specification explicitly recommends against the use of
this mode, stressing it is included only to support legacy signing
interfaces. Consequently, we do not discuss it further.
Parameter Description Instantiation for Ed25519
q The finite field size q 2255 − 19
n Secret scalars are n+ 1-bits 254
b The public key bit-length 2b−1 > q 256
a, d Curve parameters in Fq −1,−121665/121666
B A generator of the prime order subgroup of E (x, 4/5), x > 0
c The log2 of curve cofactor c = 3
L The prime generator order LB = 0 and 2cL = |E| 2252 + 27742 . . . 8493
H Secure hash function producing 2b-bit output SHA-512
E Curve equation in Twisted Edwards form x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2
TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR Ed25519 SIGNATURES AS DESCRIBED IN FIG. 4.
2) Bounds Checking Variants: Some variants of Ed25519
require an additional check on the received alleged signatures
during verification. In particular, this is enforced by the IETF
standard [7] and proposed in the NIST draft standard [47]. In
these variants, implementers are required to reject signatures
whose S parameter is equal to or larger than L, where
L is the order of the prime-order subgroup. Contrastingly,
Ed25519-Original implementations merely check S is a 256-
bit integer. We refer to such implementations as Ed25519-IETF.
This is claimed to have a substantial impact and achieve strong
unforgeability. We investigate this further in Section V but
already note that, contrastingly to Ed25519-IETF variants,
Ed25519-Original implementations simply reduce the received
signature element S mod L during signature verification,
thereby immediately ruling out SUF-CMA security.
3) Point and Bound Checking Variants: Some popular
implementations of Ed25519, such as LibSodium [8], perform
the bounds check on S values in addition to point validation.
Specifically, Ed25519-LibS ensures that received elements are
canonically encoded and have order L. This check means
that certain R values, which are low order points on the
curve, are rejected during verification as well as low order
public keys. Additionally, R values and public keys which
have y-coordinates above q are also rejected to ensure unique
encodings. We see the impact of these decisions in Section V-C.
B. Differences from Schnorr Signatures
Ed25519 has several notable features which differentiate
it from traditional Schnorr signatures. The original Schnorr
signature scheme and its underlying identification protocol
can be recalled in Appendix A. In particular, private keys in
Ed25519 are clamped to a specific format, signature nonces
are chosen deterministically, and signed messages are prefixed
with public keys. As indicated before, these differences impact
the security of the overall signature scheme and our analysis.
We next discuss these alterations in more detail.
1) Group Structure: Ed25519’s curve is of order 8L for
L a large prime defined in Table II. Contrastingly, Schnorr
signatures are typically constructed over prime order groups
and implementations are assumed to reject the identity element.
Non-prime order groups contain a more complex group
structure than prime order groups. In particular, non-prime
order groups entail the presence of additional subgroups,
whose elements lie outside the intended prime order subgroup.
Performing group operations on these elements can lead to
surprising results, including confinement under exponentiation,
where they map to a small range of elements and leakage,
where performing exponentiation with a private scalar leaks
information about that scalar.
Proofs about systems defined over prime order groups do not
necessarily hold if the system is implemented with non-prime
order groups, even when the proof does not explicitly rely on
the prime order structure. For example, proofs typically assume
that any group element can be written as the exponentiation
of a fixed generator, or that exponentiation of an element is
uniformly distributed over the group. In the non-prime order
case, neither assumption is true in general.
2) Group Element Checks: The question of how values
should be decoded and parsed is often omitted from academic
papers. Ed25519-Original and Ed25519-IETF are of particular
interest in this regard as it is explicitly argued that elements
do not need to be checked to ensure they belong to the prime
order subgroup. This means any group element, including small
order elements, the identity element and elements of order 8L
will be accepted. We discussed variants that mandate this check
in Section IV-A3. The related Diffie-Hellman function X25519
also omits these checks which has previously lead to otherwise
avoidable attacks on protocols employing it [50].
A related issue is whether elements are checked to en-
sure they lie on the intended curve, rather than its twist.
Whilst X25519 does not reject elements on the twist,
Ed25519-Original explicitly mandates that points are checked
to ensure they do belong to E. This is checked during the
decompression of received points prior to signature verification.
We assume all implementations uphold this requirement as
otherwise point addition during signature verification is not
necessarily defined.
3) Private Key Clamping: In part due to the non-prime order
nature of the curve and the lack of group element validation,
Ed25519 mandates the use of key clamping which involves the
bitwise manipulation of private keys prior to use in signing.
The rationale behind this requirement has been the subject of
much debate [51], [52]. The original Ed25519 paper defines
private keys, without discussion, such that a high bit is always
set and three low bits are cleared. All subsequent variations
have kept the same requirement. There are two rationales for
clamping:
Firstly, setting the high bit ensures that some deficient point
multiplication implementations, which have variable execution
time with respect to the position of the highest set bit in the
scalar, become constant time [53].
Secondly, clearing the low bits ensures that the scalar is a
multiple of the cofactor and thus the result of applying the
scalar to any group element results in an element in the prime
order subgroup. This avoids key leakage attacks, although
these attacks are not relevant for Ed25519 signature schemes
as private keys are never applied to adversary-provided group
elements. However, as implementers may wish to re-use keys
in both X25519 and Ed25519, this choice provides defence in
depth.
As we will see later, the use of clamping complicates our
security proofs. This is because not every element in the prime
order subgroup is also a valid public key as produced by the key
generation algorithm. Consequently, when providing reductions
which must manipulate public keys, e.g., blinding them, there
is a small chance an invalid public key is produced and the
reduction must abort.
4) Key Prefixing: Unlike traditional Schnorr signatures,
Ed25519 uses key prefixing, where the signature scheme,
prior to signing or verification, prepends the public key to the
message. This choice has also been the subject of much debate
[28], [31], [54], [55] as to whether it provides a substantial
improvement in security. Much of the discussion has revolved
around multi-user security and whether key prefixing improves
security in the presence of an adversary who is satisfied to
break some subset of witnessed multiple keys, rather than one
key in particular. We discuss the multi-user security of Ed25519
in more detail in Appendix C. It transpires that key prefixing
also has benefits when considering lesser-known multi-user
security properties such as message key substitution attacks,
as we show in Section V-C.
5) Deterministic Nonce Generation: Signature schemes
require the use of a nonce with each signed message. This
has historically been an area prone to subtle implementation
mistakes leading to critical real world vulnerabilities [56].
Ed25519 uses deterministic signing which removes the need
for fresh random numbers during the signing process. This does
not lead to any particular consequences for our security analysis
since we model the key derivation function as a random oracle.
However, it is well known not to reduce security [57].
V. THE SECURITY OF ED25519
We now present our security results for Ed25519-Original
and Ed25519-IETF signatures. As suggested by earlier works
that informally discuss the security of these schemes, we use the
Fiat-Shamir approach. However, as elaborated in Section IV-B,
there exist marked differences between Schnorr signatures
and Ed25519 signatures such that the established security
results for Schnorr do not hold without careful adjustment
to the Ed25519 setting. We close this gap by proving both the
existential unforgeability of Ed25519-Original and show that
due to the additional check on the value S, Ed25519-IETF and
Ed25519-LibS achieve strong unforgeability. As is common
for signature proofs, we assume idealized versions of hash
functions (random oracles), but do not make any strong
assumptions on the properties of the underlying elliptic curve
group. Tighter security bounds may be possible in the so-called
generic group model (cf., e.g., [28], [58]), however we explicitly
want to explore security in a setting where the adversary may
take advantage of, e.g., encoding details.
We recall that, in the following, E refers to the twisted Ed-
wards curve underlying Ed25519 (cf. Table II) and analogously
E(Fq) denotes the set of elements on the curve which forms
a group with point addition, as defined in Section III.
A. Existential Unforgeability of Original Ed25519
We start by showing EUF-CMA security of
Ed25519-Original specifically by means of the Fiat-
Shamir transform. We first define an appropriate canonical
identification protocol CID in Fig. 5 to which the transform
can be applied, then show that CID satisfies the necessary
prerequisites in Theorem 1 and 2 and finally apply the
transform in Theorem 3 to establish existential unforgeability
of the resulting signature scheme. We note that with the
additional check in Line 17 of CID, the proof of EUF-CMA
security directly carries over to Ed25519-IETF and with the
further check described in Table I also to Ed25519-LibS.
KGen(pp):
1 k $←− {0, 1}b
2 h← H(k)





5 return (A, k)
P1(k):
6 h← H(k)





9 r $←− {0, 1}2b
10 R← rB
11 return (R, st)
V1:
12 ch $←− {0, 1}2b
13 return ch
P2(ch, st):
14 S ← (r + ch · st) mod L
15 return S
V2(A,R, S, ch):
16 Check R,A ∈ E
17 Variant Specific Checks
18 return J8SB = 8R+ 8chAK
Fig. 5. Canonical identification protocol CID = (KGen,P = (P1,P2),V =
(V1,V2)) underlying Ed25519-Original in Fig. 4. Note that the highlighted
line (17) varies depending on the version of Ed25519 and the appropriate
check is listed in Table I.
To get from CID in Fig. 5 to the Ed25519-Original in
Fig. 4, we apply a variant of Fiat-Shamir, denoted by FSkpdet,
that captures deterministic signing and key-prefixing.
Deterministic signing is achieved by deterministically de-
riving the randomness r of P1 in the signing algorithm via
r ← H(h[b], ..., h[2b− 1],m), where m is the message to be
signed, and, as before, h[i] denotes the i-th bit of h. The
de-randomization of signing by computing the randomness
deterministically as some H(sk,m) is common and in our
case does not impact the security of the resulting signatures,
assuming H is at least a pseudorandom function (cf., e.g., [57]).
Recall that key-prefixing, on the other hand, describes the
derivation of the challenge ch by the prover during signature
generation as H(R,A,m) instead of H(R,m), i.e., by also
including the public key into the hash function. It will become
clear from the proof that this additional input to the random
oracle H does not impact security, since this solely relies on R
being sufficiently unpredictable in honest signature generations.
1) Security of the underlying identification protocol: We
show that the underlying CID is secure against impersonation
attacks by passive adversaries (IMP-PA security, cf. Defini-
tion 4). We do this in a two-step process by first showing in The-
orem 1 that CID is secure against impersonating adversaries
that only have access to the public key (IMP-KOA security). To
lift this result to the setting of passive impersonating adversaries,
we then only need to be able to simulate queries to the oracle
OTrans, which can be achieved by the HVZK property of CID.
Thus, in Lemma 1 we show that CID is HVZK and, combined
with the IMP-KOA security, we achieve IMP-PA security.
Theorem 1 (CID is IMP-KOA secure). Let CID =
(KGen,P,V) be the identification protocol as defined in Fig. 5.
If ECDLP is (t, εecdlp)-hard on E(Fq), then CID is (t′, ε′)-







Proof Sketch. The full proof can be found in the Appendix B-A
We notice the first marked difference to proofs of Schnorr
signatures. While in the latter, we have a straightforward
reduction to ECDLP using the rewinding technique [24], we
now need to account for the secret key clamping in Ed25519.
The clamping causes that an element A ∈ E(Fq) is not
necessarily a valid public key output of KGen and thus cannot
be relayed by the reduction to the IMP-KOA adversary A,
resulting in the loss of a factor of 2
b−5
L . As in the Schnorr
setting, the reduction exploits the property that from two
valid conversations (R?, ch1, S1) and (R
?, ch2, S2) for the
public key A with ch1 6= ch2 (mod L), we can extract the
value s = S1−S2ch1−ch2 mod L such that A = sB. The Reset
Lemma [59] which is the analogue of the Forking Lemma [24]
for identification protocols instead of signatures, ensures that
two such conversations can be found with probability at least
(ε′ − 1L )
2, where ε′ is the success probability of A. We note
the hardness of ECDLP on E(Fq) as used in Ed25519 carries
over from the respective hardness on curve25519 due to
their birational equivalence [6], [7].
As mentioned before, we now lift this result to show
that an adversary cannot impersonate the prover, even when
given access to an oracle OTrans, that outputs valid accepting
conversations Trans [P V]. This is due to the fact, that the
underlying canonical identification protocol CID is εzk-HVZK,
i.e., there exists a simulator Sim which takes as input only the
public key pk outputs conversations (com, ch, rsp) which are
εzk-indistinguishable from real conversations P(sk) V(pk).
The simulator Sim(pk) for CID is defined in Fig. 6 and exploits
the fact that commitments can be recovered from the public
key, the challenge, and the response. The proofs can be found
in Appendix B-B and B-C, respectively.
Sim(A):
1 ch $←− {0, 1}2b
2 s̃ $←− {0, 1}2b
3 S ← s̃ mod L
4 R← (SB − chA) mod L
5 return (R, ch, S)
Fig. 6. Simulator Sim for CID.
Lemma 1. Let CID = (KGen,P,V) be as defined in Fig. 5.
Then CID is HVZK with εzk = 0.
Theorem 2 (CID is IMP-PA secure). Let CID =
(KGen,P,V) be the εzk-HVZK and (t, ε)-IMP-KOA-secure
identification protocol as defined in Fig. 5. Then CID is
(t′, ε′, QT )-IMP-PA-secure with t ≈ t′and ε′ ≤ ε.
2) Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform: Now that we have
shown that the identification protocol satisfies the prerequisites
for the Fiat-Shamir transform, we can apply the transform to
show that Ed25519 is existentially unforgeable. We state the
theorem in terms of the most basic version Ed25519-Original.
For Ed25519-IETF and thus Ed25519-LibS the proof below
only needs to account for the difference in the verification
algorithm.
Theorem 3 (Ed25519-Original is EUF-CMA secure). Let
CID = (KGen,P,V) be the (t, ε,QT , (QH + Qκ + Qβ))-
IMP-PA-secure identification protocol as defined in Fig. 5 with
H : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}2b modeled as a programmable random
oracle and α bits min-entropy. Then Ed25519-Original =
FSkpdet[CID,H] as defined in Fig. 4 is (t′, ε′, QS , (Q′H +Qκ +
Qβ))-EUF-CMA secure, where
t ≈ t′ and ε′ ≤ Q′H · (ε+QSQ′H2−α +Qκ2−b)
for QS = QT and Q′H = QH + 1, where Qκ and Qβ refer to
random oracle queries of a certain format (details in proof.)
Proof. In the following we assume without loss of generality,
that the adversary A never queries the same message twice to
the oracle OSign, since Ed25519-Original is deterministic and
thus A does not gain any advantage in doing so.
Assume there exists a (t′, ε′, QS , (Q′H + Qκ + Qβ))-
adversary A against the unforgeability of the signature scheme
Ed25519-Original. We show that this immediately implies a
successful (t, ε,QT , (QH +Qκ+Qβ)) adversary B against the
IMP-PA security of the underlying identification scheme CID.
The reduction B receives as input a public key A. B then runs
A on input A as follows.
We note that the relevant random oracle queries of A can
take three distinct and distinguishable forms: the most relevant
to the reduction are those of the form (com, A,m), i.e., a b-bit
string followed by the encoding A, and some arbitrary-length
bit-string m. The second distinct case are those queries of
length exactly b bits. Any other query can be interpreted as
a query of the form (β,m) with β a b-bit string and m some
arbitrary-length bit-string.
Random oracle queries of the form κ: Let κ be a b-bit
string. Let Qκ be the maximum number of queries of the form
κ that A makes to H. The reduction B simply forwards these
queries to H and returns the answer to A.
Random oracle queries of the form (β,m): Let β be a
bit string of length b and let Qβ be the number of queries of
the form (β,m) that A makes to H. Again, B simply relays
these queries between H and A.
Random oracle queries of the form (com, A,m): Let
Q′H be the (maximal) number of queries of this form that
A makes to the random oracle H. B guesses the query i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , Q′H} for which A will eventually output the signature
forgery, resulting in a loss of a factor Q′H. For every of the
other QH = Q′H − 1 queries j ∈ {1, 2, . . . Q′H} with j 6= i
to H, B simply relays the queries between A and H. When
the adversary A asks the i-th query, say on (com′, A,m′), B
forwards com′ as its commitment to its own challenger. The
challenger will then send a challenge ch? $←− {0, 1}2b to B,
which B returns as response to A.
Signing queries: For every of the QS signing queries of A,
B runs its own OTrans oracle to obtain an accepting conversation
(R, ch, S). In order for (R,S) to be a valid signature on m, B
must ensure that ch = H(R,A,m), i.e., the reduction programs
the random oracle on these values to return ch.
Note that for each commitment value R that was output by
OTrans, the probability that the value H(R,A,m) had been set
by a previous query of A to the random oracle H, and thus that
A could detect the inconsistency in the patched random oracle,
is upper bounded by Q′H2
−α, where α is the min-entropy of
the identification scheme. The distribution of commitments has








to the bias introduced by sampling first a uniformly random
2b-bit string and then reducing it modulo L. If this happens,
the reduction B aborts, the probability of which is thus upper
bounded by QSQ′H · 2−α.
Furthermore, note that this also implies that the value R
provided by the simulation via OTrans is with high probability
different from the deterministic value R′ with R′ = r′B that
would be generated in the real signing process of the message
m with secret key k belonging to the public key A. However,
A is not able to compute the deterministic commitment value
R′ by itself unless it can guess the correct value k to determine
h[b], ...h[2b− 1] of h← H(k) and thus r′, the probability of
which is bounded by Qκ2−b.
Note that it does not help A in detecting the simulation to
guess the values h[b], ...h[2b−1], as A has no way of checking
that these are the correct values leading to the “real” r′ without
also guessing k.
Existential Forgery: At some point A terminates with a
forgery output (m?, σ? = (R?, S?)) with R? = com′ and
m? = m′. If this is not the case, B aborts with probability
1
Q′H
since it has wrongly guessed the index i for which the
forgery will take place. Assuming this is a valid forgery in the
EUF-CMA game, it holds that m′ has not been queried to OSign.
In particular this means that the output of H(com′, A,m′) has
not been re-programmed in A’s view by B to a value other
than ch?. Furthermore, V2(A, com′, ch?, S?) = 1 holds such
that when B forwards S? to its own challenger as final output
of its game, B will also be successful.
The running time t of B is that of A plus the time it takes
to query the random oracle H (Q′H +Qκ+Qβ) times, the time
it takes to query its challenger, and to query OTrans QT = QS
times. As before, we write t ≈ t′ since the running time of the
reduction is dominated by the running time t′ of A. If A outputs
a forgery with probability ε′, then B will be able to impersonate
the prover with probability ε
′
Q′H
−QSQ′H · 2−α −Qκ2−b.
B. Strong Unforgeability of Standardized Ed25519
Our previous results confirm that for a target public key,
the adversary is not able to forge a signature on a message
m for which it has not seen valid signatures beforehand. In
a real-world scenario, the security provided by existential
unforgeability may be insufficient, as we have mentioned
before, e.g., regarding Bitcoin transaction security or SSH
multi-ciphersuite security. Another commonly named example
is that of blocking certain public-key certificates. This could
be achieved by storing the hash of the certificate in a list and
comparing incoming certificates with this list. Here, a certificate
can simply be viewed as a signature over a message, i.e., the
contents of the certificate. An adversary wanting to bypass
this blocking mechanism may create a new valid signature
on the certificate, thereby altering its hash value that made
the certificate efficiently recognizable by the filter. This is not
prevented by existential unforgeability.
The security notion that bars adversaries from forging new
signatures on known (message,signature)-pairs is that of strong
unforgeability, or SUF-CMA security, which is closely related
to the concept of malleability. Malleable signatures retain their
validity even if they are slightly changed, for example, by some
bits being flipped. Obviously such signature schemes cannot
hope to achieve strong unforgeability.
As mentioned earlier, Ed25519-Original without the check
of S ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} during signature verification is not
strongly unforgeable as any S′ ← S+mL with integer m also
satisfies the verification equation.
For Ed25519-IETF and Ed25519-LibS, this is avoided by
additionally requiring that the decoded S already be reduced
modulo L, leading to the rejection of values S′ ← S + mL
during signature verification. The property that results from this
additional check on the CID level is that of (computationally)
unique responses of the identification protocol. Recall that this
property guarantees that for a given commitment com and ch
in the interaction P V, there exists (at most) one response
rsp such that (com, ch, rsp) is an accepting conversation (or
a second response is only possible to find with probability at
most εcur).
For the identification protocol underlying Ed25519-IETF, we
in fact even have εcur = 0, i.e., for all (A, k) $←− CID.KGen,
(R = rB, s) ← P1(k; r) and ch $←− {0, 1}2b, there exists
only at (most) one valid response S. This confirms the RFC’s
argumentation that “Ed25519 [. . . ] signatures are not malleable
due to the verification check that decoded S is smaller than
L” [7]. On an Ed25519-IETF signature level this then means
that given a (message,signature)-pair (m, (R,S)) there exists
no second signature (R,S′) with S′ 6= S as we will show in
the next theorem. Furthermore, we will argue that there also
cannot exist a second valid signature (R′, S′) with R′ 6= R
with S′ different or equal to S.
Theorem 4 (Ed25519-IETF is SUF-CMA secure). Let
Ed25519-IETF be the (t, ε,QS , QH)-EUF-CMA secure signa-
ture scheme derived by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to
the identification protocol CID given in Fig. 5 with the check
in Line 17. Then Ed25519-IETF is (t′, ε′, Q′S , Q
′
H)-SUF-CMA
secure with t ≈ t′ and ε′ ≤ ε.
Proof. We recall that the games of EUF-CMA and SUF-CMA
only differ in the winning condition for the adversary A:
EUF-CMA forbids that the adversary has queried the signing
oracle OSign on the message m? for which it outputs the
forgery, whereas SUF-CMA allows this and only requests that
the signature forgery σ? differs from the signature σ that was
output by OSign(m?).
We therefore focus on the case that the adversary A on input
an Ed25519-IETF public key A outputs a valid strong forgery
(m?, σ? = (R?, S?)) with probability ε′ such that there exists
an entry (m?, σ′ = (R′, S′)) ∈ LSign of recorded OSign queries
of A, such that σ? 6= σ′. Since encodings are deterministic and
unique 2, we omit them in the following discussion. Naturally,
there are two ways in which σ? = (R?, S?) 6= σ′ = (R′, S′)
for the same message m?:
Case 1 R? 6= R′: In this case, we can immediately build a
reduction B against the EUF-CMA security of Ed25519-IETF.
The reduction B gets as input a public key A and invokes
the SUF-CMA adversary A(A). For any of the maximal Q′S
signing queries of A on message m, B simply uses the strategy
of the simulator Sim (cf. Fig. 6) to obtain valid conversations
(R, ch, S) and patches the random oracle H to return ch on
input (R,A,m). As before, this programming ensures that the
response (R,S) to A is a valid signature from A’s point of
view. The at most Q′H random oracle queries of A are simulated
by B relaying queries to the “real” random oracle H on any
inputs that had not been patched by a signature query, the latter
are answered consistently with the patching. Note that to run
the simulation of A, B has made no signing query to its own
OSign. Thus, once A outputs its strong forgery (m?, σ?), B
can immediately output the same pair as its existential forgery.
Note that since R? 6= R′, H has not been patched by B on
(R?, A,m?).
Case 2 S? 6= S′: This leaves the possibility that R? = R′,
but S? 6= S′, i.e., the strongly forged signature is of the
form (R′, S?). We will argue that this also is not possible, as
this contradicts the uniqueness of the underlying identification
protocol: For CID it holds that there is only (at most) one
valid response S for all (A, k) $←− CID.KGen, (R = rB, s)←
P1(k; r) and ch $←− {0, 1}2b. Assume otherwise, i.e., there
exist S 6= S′ such that both (R, ch, S) and (R, ch, S′) are
valid conversations wrt. the public key A. To pass verification
via V2 it must hold that S, S′ ∈ {0, ..., L−1} and furthermore
8SB = 8R+ 8chA and 8S′B = 8R+ 8chA, or, equivalently,
8SB = 8S′B, contradicting the assumption that S 6= S′. Since
verification of an Ed25519-IETF signature (R,S) on message
m for public key A is just executing the verifier V2 on input
(A,R,H(R,A,m?), S) it is clear by the same argument that
there cannot be a strong forgery with S? 6= S′.
To conclude, since the probability of computing non-unique
responses in CID is 0 and the signature scheme does not
admit existential forgeries with non-negligible probability, the
probability of an adversary A succeeding against the strong
unforgeability is also negligible.
The proofs so far capture adversary attacking a single key,
for a discussion of multi-user security od Ed25519, we refer
the interested reader to Appendix C.
C. Key Substitution Attacks
Key Substitution Attacks (KSA) were first introduced by
Blake-Wilson and Menezes [60] and later formalized by Smart
2Note that there is a very small probability that there exist two different
encodings R1, R2 such that they decode to the same element R. This is
due to the fact that elements in E(Fq) are encoded as b bit strings with a
(b− 1)-bit encoding for the y coordinate, plus one bit for the sign of x. Thus
the entire valid encoding space for the y coordinate encompasses integers
from 0 to 2b−1 − 1 = 2255 − 1, whereas Fq contains only the integers from
0 to 2255 − 20. Nevertheless, Case 1 in the reduction also captures this.
and Menezes [32]. Informally, KSA cover the scenario where
an adversary learns one or more (message,signature)-pairs for
a given public key, and wishes to find a different public key
and message such that one of the valid signatures verify under
the adversary’s new public key. Maliciously generated public
keys fall outside the traditional notions for signature security
such as existential unforgeability. However, these attacks have
practical consequences in real-world contexts: examples include
an attack on the popular Let’s Encrypt Certificate Issuance
protocol that allowed an attacker to impersonate any website,
compromise of confidentiality in the WS-Security Standard,
and attacks on the well known Station to Station protocol [4].
Comparatively few publications have investigated key substi-
tution attacks and how they apply to different signature schemes.
Consequently, many signature schemes are vulnerable. For
example, [32] described a KSA on the Gennaro-Halevi-Rabin
signature scheme [61] and the standard-model secure scheme by
Boneh and Boyen [62] also proved to be vulnerable [63]. While
these schemes are more of an academic interest, [60], [63]
also showed that under certain conditions the widely-deployed
RSA, DSA, and ECDSA signatures are insecure against KSA
adversaries. Menezes and Smart also highlighted the relevance
of key-substitution [32] to the multi-user setting.
In [19], a practical scheme for email authentication is
proposed that requires the underlying signature scheme to
be resistant to key substitution attacks. In this paper, it is stated
that Schnorr signatures in prime order groups achieve SUF-
CMA and resistance to key substitution attacks. The paper
goes on to claim these results transfer to a variant of Ed25519
without key prefixing. We have already seen that this is not
true in general and we also point out that it is not correct
for their modified form of Ed25519. In particular, absent key
prefixing, an adversary can submit a mangled public key lying
outside the prime order group which is a distinct bitstring from
the ‘honest’ signature yet passes the verification checks. Later
in this section we consider Ed25519 with key-prefixing and
find the opposite result, that this attack is provably prevented.
In the following, we investigate the resistance of Ed25519
against various exclusive ownership definitions from [5] which
rule out multiple key substitution attacks. Theorem 5 shows that
Ed25519 achieves this stronger version, cf. Definition 11, where
the adversary is allowed to adaptively query the signing oracle
to learn (message,signature)-pairs of its choice and may choose
which signature to attack. Furthermore, we show in Theorem 6
that Ed25519 has so-called message-bound signatures (cf.
Definition 12), i.e., that there exist no two distinct messages
for which the same signature would verify with respect to a
given (potentially maliciously generated) public key. Lastly,
Theorem 7 shows that if small order elements are rejected,
even malicious strong universal exclusive ownership guarantees
are provided. We give the proofs for Theorems 5, 6, and 7 in
Appendix B. Firstly, we find that an adversary cannot substitute
an alternative public key to verify against an honest party’s
signature in any of the Ed25519 variants we have discussed.
Definition 11 (Strong Universal Exclusive Ownership). Let
GS-UEOS,A (pp):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(pp)
2 ((m,σ), pk′,m′) $←− AOSign (pk)
3 return J(m,σ) ∈ LSign ∧ pk 6= pk′ ∧ Vfy(pk′, σ,m′)K
OSign(m):
4 σ $←− Sign(sk,m)
5 LSign ← LSign ∪ {(m,σ)}
6 return σ
Fig. 7. Security game S-UEO
GMBSS,A(pp):
1 (pk, σ,m,m′) $←− A()
2 return Jm 6= m′ ∧ Vfy(pk, σ,m) ∧ Vfy(pk, σ,m′)K
Fig. 8. Security game MBS
S = (KGen,Sign,Vfy) be a signature scheme. Consider the
security games GS-UEOS,A as defined in Fig. 7. We say that a
signature scheme S is (t, ε,QS)-S-UEO-secure or achieves
strong universal exclusive ownership if for any adversary A
making at most QS queries to the signing oracle, the probability
Pr
[
GS-UEOS,A (pp) = 1
]
≤ ε.
Theorem 5 (Ed25519-Original achieves S-UEO). Let
Ed25519 = (KGen,Sign,Vfy) be as defined in Fig. 4, where
H : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}2b is modelled as a random oracle. Then




where QS and QH are the maximum numbers of queries to
OSign and H.
We also find that, even when the signer is dishonest, Ed25519
schemes which reject public keys and signatures with low order
elements, ensure that for a particular public key, signatures
can only verify under a single message. However, if low order
elements are accepted, an adversary can submit a low order
element as their public key and any value for their signature
such that SB = R. The resulting signature verifies under any
message. This was pointed out in [1] but deemed unproblematic.
Definition 12 (Message Bound Signatures). Let S = (KGen,
Sign,Vfy) be a signature scheme. Consider the security games
GMBSS,A as defined in Fig. 8. We say that a signature scheme S
is (ε)-MBS-secure or achieves message bound signatures if
for any adversary A the probability: Pr
[
GMBSS,A (pp) = 1
]
≤ ε.
Theorem 6 (Ed25519-LibS achieves MBS). Let Ed25519 =
(KGen,Sign,Vfy) be as defined in Fig. 4 and the hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2b is a random oracle. If the small
subgroup elements are rejected, then S is (ε′)-MBS-secure
with ε′ ≤ d 2
2b
L e · 2
−2b · (QH + 2)2, where QH is the maximal
number of queries to the random oracle.
We now consider a stronger variant of S-UEO where the
adversary collaborates or compromises with the signer, in order
to generate a signature valid under two distinct public keys.
Provided small subgroup elements are rejected, this property
GM-S-UEOS,A (pp):
1 (pk, pk′, σ,m,m′) $←− A()
2 return Jpk 6= pk′ ∧ Vfy(pk, σ,m) ∧ Vfy(pk′, σ,m′)K
Fig. 9. Security game M-S-UEO
also holds. However, there is a straightforward attack if they
are accepted where the adversary chooses its public key to be
two distinct low order elements.
Definition 13 (Malicious Strong Universal Exclusive Own-
ership). Let S = (KGen,Sign,Vfy) be a signature scheme.
Consider the security games GM-S-UEOS,A as defined in Fig. 9.
We say that a signature scheme S is (ε)-M-S-UEO-secure
or malicious strong universal exclusive ownership if for any
adversary A the probability: Pr
[
GM-S-UEOS,A (pp) = 1
]
≤ ε.
Theorem 7 (Ed25519-LibS achieves M-S-UEO). Let S =
(KGen,Sign,Vfy) be as defined in Fig. 4, with the
Ed25519-LibS variant and the hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}2b is a random oracle. Then S is (ε′)-M-S-UEO-secure





We proved that Ed25519 achieves its goal of existential
unforgeability (EUF-CMA), as is assumed by many published
works. While Ed25519 seems similar to Fiat-Shamir applied
to the Schnorr identification scheme, the devil is in the detail.
We took into account the non-prime order group, the clamping
of private scalars and many other details.
Moreover, we also proved that Ed25519-IETF achieves
SUF-CMA. We proved that all Ed25519 schemes resilient
against key substitution attacks, however, we also showed that
rejecting small order elements does yield additional properties,
enabling Ed25519-LibS to achieve an even stronger form of
key substitution resilience as well as message bound security.
Our results, summarized in Table I, thereby provide not
only theoretical foundations, but also meaningful insights for
choosing among the variants.
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APPENDIX A
SCHNORR SIGNATURES
Schnorr signatures are a prime example of the way secure
signatures can be constructed via the Fiat-Shamir transform
from secure identification protocols. [21]. They achieve short,
efficient signatures that are provably secure in the random
oracle model, assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm
problem in the underlying group. The underlying Schnorr
identification scheme, as well as the resulting signature scheme
when the Fiat-Shamir transform is applied, are depicted in
Fig. 10. Here, pp = (G, q, g) denote the public parameters of
the scheme where G is a cyclic group of prime order q with
generator g.
KGen(pp):
1 a $←− Fq
2 A← ga
3 return (A, a)
P1(a):
4 r $←− Fq
5 R← gr
6 return (R, a)
P2(ch, a):
7 S ← (R+ ch · a) mod q
8 return S
V1:
9 ch $←− Fq
10 return ch
V2(A,R, ch, S):
11 R′ ← gS ·A−ch
12 return JR′ = RK
KGen(pp):
1 a $←− Fq
2 A← ga
3 return (A, a)
Sign(a,m):
4 r $←− Fq
5 R← gr
6 ch← H(R,m)
7 S ← (R+ ch · a) mod q
8 return σ ← (ch, S)
Vfy(A,m, σ = (ch, S)):
9 R′ ← gS ·A−ch
10 ch′ ← H(R′,m)
11 return Jch′ = chK
.
Fig. 10. Schnorr signature scheme S = FS [CID,H] = (KGen, Sign,Vfy)
(right)) resulting from the Fiat-Shamir transform applied to the Schnorr
identification protocol CID = (KGen,P,V) (left).
APPENDIX B
FULL PROOFS
A. Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. Assume there exists an adversary A against the (t′, ε′)-
IMP-KOA security of CID. From this we then construct
another adversary B, the reduction, that can solve the (t, εecdlp)-
ECDLP on E(Fq). Since we assume ECDLP to be hard to
break with non-negligible probability εecdlp in any reasonable
amount of time t, this then leads to a contradiction, yielding
IMP-KOA security. B is constructed as follows: B gets as input
the base point B ∈ E(Fq) of order L, as well as a random
point A ∈ 〈B〉. Then, B runs A on input A.
We first analyze the probability of the received value A
falling into the subset of correctly distributed public keys to
invoke A. Note that the public key A in the identification
protocol is computed as A← sB with an s ∈ {2b−2, 2b−2 +
8, . . . , 2b−1 − 8}. We claim that for any public keys A1 =
s1B,A2 = s2B with s1, s2 ∈ {2b−2, 2b−2 + 8, . . . , 2b−1 − 8},
A1 = A2 if and only if s1 = s2. Note that for above s1, s2,
there must exist i1, i2 ∈ {0, ..., 2b−5 − 1} such that s1 =
2b−2 + 8i1 and s2 = 2b−2 + 8i2. Since L > 2b−5 is a prime,
it holds that
A1 = A2 ⇔ s1B = s2B
⇔ s1 = s2 mod L
⇔ 2b−2 + 8i1 = 2b−2 + 8i2 mod L
⇔ i1 = i2 mod L
⇔ i1 = i2
⇔ 2b−2 + 8i1 = 2b−2 + 8i2
⇔ s1 = s2
The above claim indicates that the cardinality of the set of
valid public keys equals 2b−5. Recall that the point A ∈ 〈B〉 is
uniformly at random. The probability of A being a valid public
key from A’s view is therefore bounded by 2
b−5
L . In particular,
substituting the instantiation of Ed25519 for the corresponding








Challenge: At some point A outputs a commitment R? to its
challenger. B then chooses a random challenge ch1 $←−
{0, 1}2b and sends ch1 to A. Finally, A terminates with
output S1.
Resetting the adversary: Then, B resets A’s internal state
back to the point just after which it generated R? and
returns a newly sampled challenge value ch2 $←− {0, 1}2b
to A with ch1 6= ch2 mod L.
Finally, again, A will output a response S2. B verifies
whether (R?, ch1, S1) and (R
?, ch2, S2) both are accept-
ing conversations with ch1 6= ch2 (mod L), and aborts
if this condition is not satisfied.
By the so-called Reset Lemma [59], we know that if A
can find an S1 such that (R
?, ch1, S1) is an accepting
conversation with probability ε′, then a reset of A with the
same random tape will output an accepting conversation
(R?, ch2, S2) for ch1 6= ch2 (mod L) with probability at
least (ε′ − 1L )
2.
B then outputs s = S1−S2ch1−ch2 mod L.
Assume that (R?, ch1, S1) and (R
?, ch2, S2) are accepting
conversations with ch1 6= ch2 (mod L). In particular, it holds
that Si ∈ {0, ..., L − 1} and 8SiB = 8R? + 8chiA for i ∈
{1, 2}, which implies that
8(S1 − S2)B = 8(ch1 − ch2)A
⇔ (S1 − S2) · (ch1 − ch2)−1B = A
Therefore, s = S1−S2ch1−ch2 mod L is the desired solution to
the ECDLP instance (B,A). Regarding the time complexity,
it holds that t ≈ 2t′, as B rewound A’s internal state once.
Finally, we can deduce that the probability of B successfully
extracting the discrete logarithm is at least 2
b−5
L (ε
′ − 1L )
2.
B. Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. We must show that the conversations (R, ch, S) $←−
Sim(A) are distributed identically to Trans [P(k) V(A)] in
honest executions of CID.
In the following let (com, ch, rsp) be a valid honest execution
between the prover and the verifier. It holds that com is the
encoding of an element rB in the elliptic curve group with
r $←− {0, 1}2b, ch $←− {0, 1}2b and rsp is the encoding of an
element in {0, ..., L−1} of the form (r+ch ·s) mod L, with
s implicitly fixed by the decoding of A = sB.
Clearly, the challenges are distributed identically in both
conversations. The (decoded) simulated responses S ← s̃
with s̃ $←− {0, 1}2b are also distributed identically to real
responses rsp = (r + ch · s) mod L, with r, ch $←− {0, 1}2b.
The same holds for the (decoded) simulated commitments
R← (SB − chA) mod L = (S − ch · s)B mod L and the
real commitments com, since the latter are in the elliptic curve
group of the form com ← rB with r $←− {0, 1}2b, which is
equivalent to r′B with r′ ← r mod L.
C. Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 1 that CID is εzk-HVZK
with εzk = 0. Since Sim(pk) uses public information only,
any resulting conversations could also have been computed
by A itself. A therefore learns nothing from the interaction
of P V via OTrans (replaced by Sim). Thus, for canonical
identification protocols that are HVZK, IMP-PA security is
equivalent to IMP-KOA security and we have ave ε′ ≤ ε and
t ≈ t′ plus the running time of the Sim at most QT times.
Since t is dominated by t′, we simply write t ≈ t′.
D. Proof for Theorem 5
Proof. Assume there exists an adversary A that can break the
(ε,QS)-S-UEO security of Ed25519. This means that for an
honestly generated key pair (A, k) $←− KGen, given the public
key A, A can output
(
(m,σ = (R,S)), A′,m′
)
such that:
1) σ ← Sign(k,m) for one of the QS signing queries of A.
In particular, we have 8SB = 8R+ 8H(R,A,m)A.
2) A′ 6= A, which means that A′ 6= A.
3) Verification Vfy(A′, σ,m′) holds, i.e., 8SB = 8R +
8H(R,A′,m′)A′.
Let ch← H(R,A,m) and ch′ ← H(R,A′,m′). Observing
property 2, properties 1) and 3) can only hold simultaneously
if and only if one of the following (distinct) cases arises:
Case 1: It holds that SB = R in property 1). Then A can
simply output a low order point A′, i.e., with |A′| ≤ L
and m′ = m, which causes property 3) to also collapse
to SB = R, irrespective of the value ch′. This can
only happen in property 1) if ch = 0 (mod L) or
ch = s−1 (mod L) for A = sB. But since H is a
random oracle, this happens only with probability at most




L e · 2
−2b
)
. So in the following we have
SB 6= R.
Case 2 A can guess A′ 6= A with |A′| ≥ L and m′ such that
ch′A′ = chA. But, again, since H is a random oracle,
the probability of this succeeding, accounting for the
adversary’s ability to repeat the process, is bounded by
QH · d 2
2b
L e · 2
−2b.
E. Proof for Theorem 6
Proof. Let A denote an adversary against (ε′)-MBS security of
Ed25519. We then give the concrete upper bound of ε′ in the
random oracle model. Assume that A terminates with (pk =
A, σ = (R,S),m,m′) and wins the MBS experiment in Fig. 8.
Then, it holds that m 6= m′, 8SB = 8R + 8H(R,A,m)A,
and 8SB = 8R+ 8H(R,A,m′)A, which further implies that
8H(R,A,m)A = 8H(R,A,m′)A. Note that A is not a small
subgroup element, it must hold that
H(R,A,m) = H(R,A,m′) mod L, m 6= m′. (1)
Obviously, we have ε′ ≤ Pr[Eq.(1) holds]. Note that the
random oracle in the MBS experiment will evaluate at most
(QH + 2) different inputs, where at most QH ones are
queried by A and two are queried by the challenger for final
verifications. Moreover, Eq. (1) holds only if there exists two
outputs of the random oracle on different inputs such that the
outputs are congruent modulo L, which occurs with probability
from above bounded by d 2
2b
L e · 2
−2b · (QH + 2)2. Hence, it
holds that ε′ ≤ d 2
2b
L e · 2
−2b · (QH + 2)2.
F. Proof for Theorem 7
Proof. It follows from the verification equation that:
8H(R, pk′,m′)pk′ = 8H(R, pk,m)pk
It then follows that from the rejection of small subgroup
elements that:
H(R, pk′,m′)a′ = H(R, pk,m)a mod L (2)
As a is in the range 1, . . . , L and thus coprime to L it follows
that
H(R, pk′,m′)a′(a)−1 = H(R, pk,m) mod L (3)
We fix a,m′, a′, then for a particular m, H(R, pk,m) is in the
range 0, . . . , 22b of which there are at most d22b/Le values




of fulfilling the equation. However,
the adversary can also vary m′ and consequently perform a
collision attack. Notice that the adversary can make up to Qh
queries and consequently the overall probability of success is






We recall that a flaw in the tight reduction from multi-
user security of signatures to the single-user case in [30] was
exposed by Bernstein [31], who then was able to give an
alternative tight reduction from the multi-user security of key-
prefixed Schnorr to the single-user security of standard Schnorr.
This result was taken as a justification for the much-debated
employed key prefixing in Ed25519 signatures. Shortly after the
result by Bernstein, Kiltz et al. [28] were able to provide a tight
reduction in the random oracle model for general Fiat-Shamir
signatures, assuming the property of random self-reducibility of
the underlying identification protocol, further fueling the debate
(though at this time the IETF standardisation of Ed25519-IETF
had already been completed). Interestingly, when trying to apply
either of the above results to Ed25519 signatures specifically,
several peculiarities arise. The result by Bernstein [31] is
transferable to Ed25519 signatures, but loses tightness. As
explained in [31, Sec. 5.3] this is due to the clamping of secret
keys in Ed25519 which yields an additional failure case in
the reduction. The more general result by Kiltz et al. [28] on
the other hand is not applicable at all, although Ed25519 is a
Fiat-Shamir transformed signature scheme. This is precisely
due to the key prefixing as this prohibits the achievement of
the necessary random self-reducibility property. Consequently,
only the non-tight bounds in [31, Sec. 5.3] apply to Ed25519.
